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Book Commentary
THE POSTULATE OF METHODOLOGICAL
PURITY IN HANS KELSEN'S PURE
THEORY OF LAW
Ilmar Tammelo*
Hans Kelsen's famous book, Reine Rechtslehre, originally published
in 1934 and completely revised and considerably expanded in 1960, has
now become available in English. The translation by Max Knight of its
second edition' has been "carefully checked by the author" 2 and can
therefore be considered as fully authentic. Regrettably it does not contain the prefaces to the first and the second editions of the book and also
lacks the valuable addendum to the latter entitled "Das Problem der
Gerechtigkeit" ("The Problem of Justice"), which are highly informative about the author's enterprise and illuminating as providing
thoughts complementary to the main body of the book. Omission of
many polemical footnotes found in the original text is a matter which
does not noticeably affect the value of the present English text.
As in all Kelsen's major works, the present book contains so many
thought-provoking ideas that only books written on them can be an
adequate response to the author's expositions of fundamental problems
of law and legal reasoning. In this review article I propose to concentrate merely on the leading idea of the present book: the principle of
methodological purity of legal science, which is one of the leading ideas
of Kelsen's entire jurisprudential thought.
Kelsen's pure theory of law proposes to be a theory of positive law in
general. "Its exclusive purpose is to know and to describe law." "As a
theory" it "attempts to answer the question what and how the law is,
not how it ought to be." One aim of this theory is "to free the science of
law from alien elements," especially to avoid its "adulteration" by "elements of psychology, sociology, ethics, and political theory." Inclusion
of these elements in legal science imports "methodological syncretism"
0
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2. Knight, Preface to H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW at 1 (1967).
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by which Kelsen means an "uncritical mixture of methodologically different disciplines ... which obscures the essence of the science of law
and obliterates the limits imposed upon it by the nature of its subject
matter." 3
There is no doubt that Kelsen's postulate of methodological purity
of legal science conveys an important message. This consists in the demand that all scholarly work should be carried out in the spirit of
impartiality, detachment, and orderliness-a guiding idea of genuine
scholarship at least as far back as Descartes' Discours de la Mdthode and
Francis Bacon's De InterpretationeNaturae Proemium. Kelsen has commendably tried to drive home the methodological principle that legal
scholars, like natural scientists or mathematicians, should properly delimit the object of their inquiry and not mix up various approaches to
it, even when each of these approaches is legitimate within its own universe of discourse. Observing strictly the postulate of methodological
purity of legal science, the legal scholar would not be able, of course, to
distinguish good law from bad law and thus to repudiate the latter.
However, this postulate is not meant to be the supreme principle of
action for one who is working in the field of law; it is only meant to be
such a principle for performing a special role in the total enterprise
relating to law, namely the role of the cogniser of law. It is well known
that Kelsen as an actually existing and acting person (as distinguished
from a person in the role of a pure theorist of law) is by no means indifferent to "how law ought to be." He rejects totalitarianism and entertains thoroughly humanitarian ideas which are to be realized also by
means of law.
Kelsen's pure theory of law is designed to be a theory of law with a
rather limited scope. First, it proposes to be merely a theory of positive
law in general. That is, it does not intend to be the theory of law in a
wider sense that includes also natural law (which many lawyers and
legal philosophers regard as a kind of law). Second, it is apparently not
meant to be also a theory of itself, that is, a meta-theory of positive law.
The present book of Kelsen has, of course, meta-theoretical aspects, because it argues for a pure theory of law. This, however, need not be an
inconsistency in Kelsen's treatment; for the system of his thought which
emerges from his discussions may still correspond to his original intention. It is quite usual (and almost unavoidable) that, for example, a
book on formal logic does not only establish the system of this logic but
3.
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also explains and justifies it. A meta-theory of the pure theory of
law obviously cannot observe the purity postulate of the pure theory
of law, above all because its object is not the object of the pure
theory of law but this pure theory itself. If it were to be conceived as
a kind of pure theory, it would be governed by its own purity postulate, whatever this may be.
Kelsen's postulate of methodological purity applies directly to the
science of positive law and only indirectly and obliquely to positive law.
This law is conceived by him as "a normative coercive order."' 4 Since
the task of the pure theory of law is considered by him to be only to
know and to describe law, it is not meant to go beyond clarification of
existing legal materials and its clarified statement. This accounts for
Kelsen's view that "the law to be applied is a frame." 5 In the present
book Kelsen is not primarily concerned with what emerges in the "lawapplying" and "law-finding" activities of competent organs or of legal
scholars. In other words, he is not primarily concerned with the ultimate determination of legal norms which are to be observed by those
whose behaviour the legal order of a given community governs. It is to
be noted that Kelsen speaks only of the law to be applied as a frame;
he does not say that law itself is a mere frame. In the dynamics of the
legal process, the law which exists as a frame is developed in various
stages (law-making by constitutional acts, legislative acts, subordinate
legislative acts, and the ultimate concretising acts performed by judicial
or administrative organs or citizens making use of their "private
6
autonomy.")
Since for Kelsen the pure theory of law is directed only to the cogni7
tion and description of law, legal interpretation as a part of this theory
is understood by him merely as "cognitive ascertainment of the meaning of the object that is to be interpreted." Such interpretation aims
only at "the cognition of several possibilities within the frame." Within
the frame which the law to be applied constitutes, "every act is legal
that stays within the frame." 8 According to this view, legal interpretation has a far more limited role than in the ordinary conception, according to which it has also to eliminate obscurity in law, overcome the
silence of law, and even to fill gaps in law. "The so-called methods of
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 350.
Id., section 35, at 221ff., on the hierarchical structure of the legal order.
Id. at 1, 348-56.
Id. at 351.
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interpretation" as traditionally conceived 9 are regarded by Kelsen as
futile. 10 He insists that interpretation is an act of cognition and not an
act of will." In doing so, Kelsen does not overlook the actual state of
legal affairs. He does not propose to exclude the operation of acts of
will from the overall legal process. He only says that acts of will should
not enter into the activity of legal interpretation.
Kelsen's postulate of methodological purity of legal science and the
pure theory of law as conceived by him must produce qualms amongst
academic as well as professional lawyers who have been accustomed to
think of fundamental or particular problems of law in a different way.
These qualms find their expression mostly in transcendent criticism of
Kelsen's position, that is, in a challenge, on grounds extrinsic to Kelsen's
system, of the assumptions of his relevant positions and what he has
built on these assumptions. I shall consider the transcendent criticisms
which may be advanced against Kelsen's purity postulate after I have
dealt with the question as to whether Kelsen himself has remained faithful to this postulate in the execution of his pure theory of law. That is
to say, I shall first attempt an immanent criticism of his enterprise insofar as it relates to the topic of the present article.
As I understand Kelsen's postulate of methodological purity of legal
science, strict adherence to it should not yield, within the pure theory of
law, any legal norms or principles, unless they prove to be findings
arrived at by mere effort to know the actually existing law. Nevertheless,
Kelsen makes statements in the context of his pure theory of law which
import what may be styled a material a prioriof law. So he states: "That
which is legally not prohibited is legally permitted' '1 2 obviously not
proposing to say: "That which is legally not prohibited is hereby defined as that which is legally permitted" and thus to equate, by a definitional fiat, the negation of a legal prohibition with a legal permission.
That Kelsen has not intended to redefine the term "legal permission"
but thought that it "must" have the above meaning is suggested by his
following reasoning: "a positive legal order can always be applied by a
court to a concrete case, even when the legal order does not contain ...
a norm positively regulating the behaviour of the defendant or accused.
...For in this case his behaviour is regulated negatively, that is, legally
9. See I. TAMMELO,
(1967).
10. H. KELSEN, PuRE
11. Id. at 353-55.
12. Id. at 243.
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not prohibited, and in this sense permitted.' ' 13 It is apparent that Kelsen
subscribes to the so-called "residual negative legal principle' '1 4 which
stipulates that there is a right to carry out a conduct if the duty to refrain from it is absent. This principle happens to be a part of many legal
orders, but it is not a universal principle of positive law. Strong iusnaturalist arguments can be advanced for its ontological "necessity,"
however, a pure theory of law which purports to dissociate itself from
natural law elements cannot take cognizance of such necessity. However it may be with national legal orders, it is certain that this principle
does not happen to be a part of the international legal order.' 5
Another example indicating that Kelsen has not always remained true
to his purity postulate may be found in his statement that two contradictory legal norms cannot be valid at the same time.' 6 This principle,
too, imports a material a priori of law, which ill agrees with the
postulate in question. It may be reasonable to desire that all civilized
legal systems contain this principle. However, it is quite conceivable
that a legal order which is a going concern contains two contradictory
legal norms and, due to oversight or vileness of the legislative authority,
contains no superior norm which would deal with the legal implications
of this contradiction. That is, it is left open whether both contradictory
norms are legally valid, legally invalid, or whether one of them is valid
and the other is invalid. The simultaneous validity of two contradictory
legal norms may be practically most deplorable, for it may legally forbid
the behaviour B as well as the behaviour non-B and the punishment of
the norm-addressee if he does not comply as well as if he does comply
with what these norms prescribe him to do. Such a situation can surely
arise only under a bad law; but Kelsen's pure theory of law is not supposed to be concerned with ethical or sociological implications of law.
These instances in which Kelsen's pure theory of law is not so pure
as it should be according to its own standards do not indicate that his
enterprise to provide such a theory is on the whole a failure. They show
only that this theory, consistent with its assumptions to a remarkable
degree, requires some purification by recourse to its own criteria. I
suspect that Kelsen's somewhat overstrained idea of the unity of legal
science projected also into the actual state of legal affairs, in which an
13. Id. at 245-46.
14. See, e.g., J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS, 188-89, 195 (1964).
15. Cf. J. Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community,
35 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 124 passim (1959).
16. H. KELSEN, PuPE THEORY OF LAW 74 (1967).
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artless unity is seen where it may be absent, 17 has allured Kelsen to the
paths of axiology or material ontology where only those of epistemology
and logic were to be trodden. His subscription to the residual negative
legal principle and his rejection of simultaneous validity of two contradictory legal norms can be understood as resulting from his insistence
on a rather overworked unity postulate supposed to govern legal cognition and legal reality.
This insistence interferes with the aspiration of Kelsen's pure theory
of law to describe faithfully "what and how the law is." It produces
what Oxford philosophers have dubbed "reductionism" doing uncalledfor violence to some established ways of juristic thinking and speaking.
Thus in the present book the word "ought" is used "in a broader than
the usual sense" generically "to express the normative meaning of an
act directed toward the behaviour of others; this 'ought' includes 'may'
and 'can.' "18 The concept of "ought" thus framed is likely to have a
disturbing effect on legal thought. There is a link, of course, between
the concepts of "ought," "may," and "can" in ordinary (and I believe
still sound) juristic usage. This link is, however, not exactly such as the
above quoted statement of Kelsen suggests. Provided that "can" is employed in a normative sense (and not in the sense of a factual ability),
it is correct to say: "X ought to do Y" implies "X can do Y" (meaning
that whatever a person has a duty to do he has also a right to do"right" used here in a wide sense). Provided that a legal order contains
the residual negative legal principle, it is correct to say: "It is not the
case that X ought not to do Y" is equivalent to "X may do Y."
It also seems that Kelsen's overworked unity postulate of legal cognition and legal reality has led him to seek and "discover" unity of law
itself where it is actually absent. Kelsen's drive for apperceiving unity
in law manifests itself, inter alia, in his view that a monistic construction
of the relationships between international law and national law is
inevitable. 19 This construction is inevitable only as one of the a priori
possibilities of the relationships in question, which may or may not be
realized in the actual world of law. The description of contemporary
legal reality yields the result that from the viewpoint of international
legal order, this legal order is supreme and all national legal orders are
subordinate to it; from the viewpoint of some national legal orders, the
17.
18.
19.
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same holds, but from the viewpoint of some others, the given national
legal order is supreme. It seems to me that the pure theory of law could
arrive only at a perspectivist construction between international law
and national law. The universal affirmation of the existence of the
monistic construction is conceivable only from the viewpoint of a
universal total legal order,which today can only be postulated as a mere
natural law system; as a positive legal order it does not yet exist. Such a
system may be highly desirable, but strict adherence to Kelsen's postulate of methodological purity of legal science would not allow us to take
cognisance of a natural law system within the framework of the pure
theory of law. Unity of law or in law may be a sign of its purity, but
purity of law is not really within the terms of reference of Kelsen's
pure theory of law, which proposes to have as its direct object the
science of positive law. Purity of law is a characteristic iusnaturalist
ideal. For a legal positivist, law is pure or impure depending on actually
existing legal states of affairs.
Finally, it may be noted about Kelsen's zeal for unity of legal cognition and legal reality that this zeal seems to have led him also to use
the term "validity" in a dubious sense. He speaks not only of valid legal
norms (which is an unimpeachable usage of this term) but also of
valid legal orders20 (which lends a iusnaturalist flavour to the term).
"Validity" in the latter sense is inadmissible in a clarified legal positivist
language, in which it is employed to signify an intrasystemic concept
applicable to norms only and not to systems of positive norms. The appropriate English term here is "existence." In German perhaps the
term "geltend" can be employed for saying that a legal order exists but
not the term "giiltig.'"
As to transcendent criticism of Kelsen's postulate of methodological
purity of legal science, it can be challenged from numerous viewpoints
extrinsic to his pure theory of law. Such a criticism need not be unfair;
for reasons for rejecting his assumptions and their corollaries may be
strong and may prove to be cogent for competent and insightful men
and thus prevail in the area of learning in question. In the following
I shall voice only a few ostensibly well-founded challenges involving
transcendent criticism of the purity postulate.
It may be argued that a pure theory of law should be conceived as
having for its immediate object not "to know and to describe positive
20. Id., e.g., at 329.
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law" but to provide appropriate tools of thought for knowing and
describing it. Knowledge and description of law would be a legitimate
concern of dogmatic legal science, not of a general, theory of law. Universality, which is a point of a general theory, can be primarily achieved
only in the establishment of sound methodological principles requisite
for the apprehension, clarification, and tidy exposition of an object of
knowledge; only secondarily and incidentally can it be found in the
principles underlying the object of knowledge itself. In the present
book, Kelsen has created the impression that he has attempted a generalized dogmatic legal science, not a strictly general theory of positive
law.
A legitimate concern of a pure theory of law directed to the furnishing of intellectual instruments for knowing and describing law could
also be the principles and methods employed in the legal process by
which law. is created, especially in the "intersticial" law-creation where
within the existing framework of law fitting legal norms are stipulated
-to remove the obscurity, to overcome the silence of law, to fill the
gaps and to deal with the antinomies in law. Law that ought to be or
will be created is also worth knowing and describing by lawyers. Reason which is to be displayed through a general theory of positive law is
needed not only for the ascertainment of what the given legal materials
are but also for determining how they should be re-formed and evolved.
This means that what Kelsen regards as the operation of "will" in law
can also be an affair of a pure theory of law, differently conceived, of
course, from his pure theory of law. Operations of will, too, have a
rational structure and they can be guided by principles of reason
governed by a purity postulate which it should be possible to formulate
for the theory of "informal" (or zetetic) reasoning.
The expansion of scope of the general theory of positive law along
the above indicated lines does not necessarily involve "adulteration"
of legal science with elements "alien" to the lawyers as actually existing
thinking and acting persons. Certain axiological, psychological, sociological, etc. elements are by no means extraneous to the work on
positive law. As servants of positive law, lawyers can scarcely close
their eyes to information and insights derivable from corresponding
disciplines of thought. To preserve intellectual discipline and integrity
in the approach to and in the treatment of positive law, the question is
not whether such elements should be excluded but which of them and
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in what way should be included so that a rationally organized legal
science as a science founded on a plurality and variety of preordinated
disciplines of thought can be secured.
What Kelsen has attempted to achieve by the statement of the postulate of methodological purity of his pure theory of law is noteworthy.
Something like this theory is, in my opinion, an important phase of
any auspicious endeavour to master intellectually positive law. I have
been encouraged to examine critically one aspect of the present book
by a statement contained in the Translator's Preface according to which
this book is not meant to be "the final word but . . .an enterprise
that would benefit by continued additions, refinements, or improvements."' 21 The contemplated additions and improvements of it may
prove to be such that they require a modification of the assumptions of
the pure theory of law offered in it. For creating a "purer," broader,
and a more adequate pure theory of law than the one at which Kelsen
has so far arrived it is essential to study carefully, patiently, and thoughtfully what Kelsen has said in his present fine book.
21. Id. at vi.
Note of Acknowledgment: This article has been prepared as a part of a research
programme on legal logic subsidied by the Australian Research Grants Committee. Some
thoughts of the article have been developed in reliance on my forthcoming book: ILMAR
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GmbH, Wiesbade, Western Germany, in the beginning of 1969.
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